1. Spectacle makes the concrete abstract and the abstract concrete: the world is pure surface, where anything can be possessed, but only as an image. That is to say, passive contemplation replaces activity: only pseudo-consumption is really possible, since one cannot do anything in a totally reified world.
Here, Debord reveals his debt to Lukacs.
2. "The true is a moment of the false" (sec. 9): The totality can only be grasped negatively, as the sum of that which has been occluded by the spectacle and the spectacle itself.
3. The spectacle steals work and non-work (rest): work moves away from life and toward the construction of the spectacle; leisure time is the opportunity to be subjected to the spectacle (to one's own alienated labor); leisure is a spectacular simulacrum of concrete freedom.
But what is the wholeness of which spectacle has robbed us?
4. "The spectacle is the map of this new world, a map that is identical to the territory it represents." (sec. 31)
5. The spectacle is at once a confirmation of already achieved abundance and the denial of its practical realization: the liberation of humanity from alienation and need.
6. The economy, as second nature, liberates humanity only to impose a new, equally permanent and equally impersonal (though voluntary!) compulsion.
7. The conquest of abundance necessitated the opening of a new sphere of production - that of desire. The economy's most important product is consumption (cf. sec. 40-43).
8. The use-value of a commodity in the age of pseudo-activity lies in its exchange-value (cf. sec. 46).
9. "The spectacle is money one can only look at." (sec. 49)
10. The function of civilization is now the support and reproduction of the economy.
11. The "economy loses all connection with authentic needs insofar as it emerges from the social unconscious that unknowingly depended on it" (sec. 51). Are authentic needs not social? Or is the support of the spectacle a false sociality which is slowly emerging?
Economy is the social subconscious. It must be made conscious and subjected to the reality principle.
12. Stars live exemplary lives as representations of society's unfulfilled promise - but they also turn the byproducts of social labor into the most desirable things: "power and vacations" (sec. 60).
The public figure is always-already spectacular, i.e. not real, nonliving.
13. The commodity economy breeds spectacular rivalries and antagonisms which are themselves commodities. The infantilization of society creates inter-generational conflict; homogenization produces cliques, fads, subcultures; radical otherness is effaced in the world of pure apprehensibility. Everything can be acquired - but only as image, only as object of contemplation. Radical otherness - the Real - recedes as noumenon. Kantian philosophy becomes intuitive (cf. sec. 62).
14. Youth itself is a commodity - the correlate of endless production and necessary obsolescence; ideal youth becomes eternal and endlessly the same - a demographic through which one passes.
15. Concentrated spectacle is totalitarianism, culminating in the cult of personality as surrogate for the existence of the masses.
16. Diffuse spectacle: capitalism celebrating itself as inaccessible totality.
17. Self-conscious hipsterism and the phenomenon of 'it's so bad it's good' are tacit admissions that there can be no talk of quality in a cultural sphere approximating Borges's Library of Babel. All demographics are provided for, and one must choose from the superabundance which makes its absurdity undeniable: stupidity, corniness, gimmickry - all become commodities; the undesirability of bad things made in bad taste makes them desirable.
18. The collection - the most idiosyncratic thing possible - is manufactured en masse. This is because idiosyncrasy is also manufactured.
19. Marxism is non-teleological insofar as its goal as theory is to make historical development conscious of itself. After that? Total openness as against the false choices of capitalism and the mechanical determinism of idealist misunderstandings.
20. The bourgeoisie are the only revolutionary class that has ever won (sec. 87); they are the class of the economy. The proletariat must become the class of consciousness - that is the necessary condition for a new society.
21. The wake of the October Revolution revealed the survival of the economy above all - the bourgeois economy could exist without a bourgeoisie: the bureaucracy with its goal of primitive accumulation would serve in its place.
22. Stalinist totalitarianism is a sort of surrogate for the capitalist spectacle - but rather than transforming reality like the latter, it only forces (with the direct application of violence) a transformation in the subjected population's perception.
23. The power of totalitarian bureaucracy is directed first and foremost to the denial of its own existence. (sec. 106)
24. Judeo-Christian religion marks a temporal revolution - a universal, unidirectional movement of time - a temporality affecting everyone and everything. It was not a complete revolution, however, and its telos was merely the beginning of the Real - the kingdom of God outside of time; but it was a definitive break with cyclical time nonetheless. (sec. 137).
25. The bourgeoisie introduce the concept of work as the transformation of history; work becomes a value in itself because it makes the world, and is not merely a condition of life. (sec. 140)
26. Global capitalism introduces universal history, but only as the temporality of the economic process, as universal reification: history is given to all just as it is taken away again.
27. The reified time of life under capitalism acquires a pseudo-cyclicity: nights/days, weekdays/weekends, vacations: it is itself a resource for temporal commodification - ultimately for the lifestyle-commodity itself.
28. "The spectacle, whose function is to use culture to bury all historical memory" (sec. 192) - the random juxtaposition of fragments which have become illegible, the construction of a false unity (as a spectacle) of a fragmented world in a fully integrated present which communicates the totality of fragmentation and the impossibility of communication: diagnosis of the postmodern condition.
29. sec. 196: structuralism as apology for the spectacle.
30. The charge that capitalism creates false desires does not necessitate the existence of true desires - merely the gratuitousness of what exists and the possibility of something better.
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
Saturday, November 1, 2008
In the Wake of a Long Absence
Can it really be that I have not written anything in this space in nearly three months? The state-dependence of memory never ceases to amaze me. A return to a place from which one has been absent is also a return to the time at which one saw that place last. In an instant, three months vanish, and I find myself in the same place. But where was I on the 9th of August? My imagination fails to construct a location in time, and I realize the falsehood of my impression. It was only a brief moment of nostalgia. In a 21-year-old life, three months cannot simply be ignored.
I've read a great many things in these last three months, although there always remains an element of doubt regarding the benefit of much of that reading. I fear that most of what I imagine is the benefit of reading a difficult book is merely the aesthetic experience of reading a difficult book. Even if an essay by Benjamin seems fascinating and provocative, I find it impossible to summarize it or even comment on it articulately to a friend. What did I gain from reading it? Some secret insight to which I will only be granted access later? Perhaps I will have an idea at some point in the future, and at that moment I will suddenly understand the essay "On Language as Such and the Language of Man?" - The thought working retroactively to make my memory of Benjamin's essay far richer and more significant.
I have to admit that it's happened before. It's an experience that has made me reflect on the nature of understanding - on the difference between understanding the semantic content of the words, clauses, and sentences that one has read and the greater meaning - implicit, holistic, ghostly in the way that it exists above and between the words - the meaning that strikes one in a moment of insight, sometimes months after putting down the text. If I try to remember the content of Beyond Good and Evil, nothing comes forth from the inscrutable, formless structure of my memory. But then I read a passage in Heidegger that denies our agency in the origination of thoughts, and I immediately recall the similar idea in Nietzsche. It's a hopeful thought - and I am wont to cling to any believable hopeful thought that - that nothing is ever actually lost in our memories.
But the two preceding paragraphs were utterly tangential, and so they owe their survival only to my permissiveness towards my proclivity for digressions. I am twenty-one years old - this is a fact which my conscience will not allow me to escape during my flights into abstraction and theory. There is a temporal core to truth, say Horkheimer and Adorno, and I agree with them totally (the time for that truth has not passed). This applies not only to epochs, but to individuals as well. Everything I write and everything I think is colored by my context. Nietzsche reminds us that every work of philosophy rests upon the psychology of its writer (usually a lonely, eccentric bachelor), and that all ethical systems aim for the legitimation of the ethicist's prejudices. To recall my earlier remark, then: when we cite individuals to quote "their" ideas - despite our skepticism towards outmoded Romantic notions of genius (that is, the ability to think in a way radically different from one's cultural and chronological compatriots) - all we are doing is uniting an idea presumably created by the discourse of many people with each other (even if that discourse coalesces inside an individual's head) with the prejudices and weaknesses of an individual author (but those are also not just his own - there is a temporal core to pathology as well).
The preceding was an appallingly byzantine sentence. I apologize to anyone who tries to parse it. I experience the desire to add footnotes to this entry, which suggests that academic stylistics are taking over my informal style, which I had thought impervious to the depredations of the Modern Language Association and the like. But I'm not going to pontificate on the stiltedness of academic prose or anything of the sort. One should consider one's critiques in context. It is all-too-easy to join in with a mob venting its bile at a target far less guilty than it presently seems. As a general ethical attitude, I should, with a few necessary exceptions, avoid condemning what is already commonly condemned. - This not to be contrary, but to discourage myself from joining into those terrible feedback loops in which one feels both righteous and comfortable in attacking someone/thing from within a mob. This is why, living in the United States, I tend to argue for Russia's perspective in discussions of geopolitics. There is, of course, not a little emotional attachment to the mythical lost garden of my childhood mixed into that as well, but I think that my rationalization, however divergent from my personal realities, is a useful ethical consideration.
If philosophers can shape profound ideas out of their longings and privations, then why can't I attempt something of the same - albeit more consciously. That an idea is borne in deception, or even that it is false as regards its explicit object, is not enough to invalidate it for other applications.
I will return now to the issue of my age, if only out of formal considerations. Why is it that I continue to think, despite knowing better, that loving someone confers a debt upon that person? The answer, I think, is that this applies validly to considerations of other "positive" relationships. In committing an act of kindness (permit me to rehabilitate the word commit), one is within one's rights to expect gratitude. If I want to become friends with someone, it is perfectly reasonable to expect that person to want to become friends with me. After all, I would not choose a totally incompatible person for friendship, and most people are only happy to make another friend. Romantic feelings are obviously different. Not only are they exclusive, but they are also not unequivocally positive, although they stubbornly continue to seem that way.
Thoughts on this issue continue to follow an economic logic: if I invest energy in having "positive" feelings for λ, then shouldn't I expect something in return - the other end of the transaction? But "positive" feelings are incommensurable. Although I can expect a person to be nicer to me because I have advanced the offer of friendship, I cannot do the same following an offer of romantic attachment. In fact, I can expect to be rather rudely spurned, or ignored, or, perhaps, laughed at.
Most people are perfectly willing to be friends with their inferiors (my fellow students do not seem to fear any effect on their reputation by taking on unflattering friends - perhaps because of the meaninglessness of most friendships). A lover, however, has to be good enough. If it is the comparative insignificance of gratitude or friendliness compared to the commitment involved in even the typically abortive romantic relationship, then I have found the answer to my question, and I must admit that any fool could have told me that. Indeed, this is a perfectly adequate answer, if not a satisfying one. Loving does not entitle one to recompense, either from the object of love or from the universe as a whole. Put frankly, no one gives a fuck. Unrequited love is an absurd screaming into a vacuum.
And so we seek the consolation of philosophy.
I've read a great many things in these last three months, although there always remains an element of doubt regarding the benefit of much of that reading. I fear that most of what I imagine is the benefit of reading a difficult book is merely the aesthetic experience of reading a difficult book. Even if an essay by Benjamin seems fascinating and provocative, I find it impossible to summarize it or even comment on it articulately to a friend. What did I gain from reading it? Some secret insight to which I will only be granted access later? Perhaps I will have an idea at some point in the future, and at that moment I will suddenly understand the essay "On Language as Such and the Language of Man?" - The thought working retroactively to make my memory of Benjamin's essay far richer and more significant.
I have to admit that it's happened before. It's an experience that has made me reflect on the nature of understanding - on the difference between understanding the semantic content of the words, clauses, and sentences that one has read and the greater meaning - implicit, holistic, ghostly in the way that it exists above and between the words - the meaning that strikes one in a moment of insight, sometimes months after putting down the text. If I try to remember the content of Beyond Good and Evil, nothing comes forth from the inscrutable, formless structure of my memory. But then I read a passage in Heidegger that denies our agency in the origination of thoughts, and I immediately recall the similar idea in Nietzsche. It's a hopeful thought - and I am wont to cling to any believable hopeful thought that - that nothing is ever actually lost in our memories.
But the two preceding paragraphs were utterly tangential, and so they owe their survival only to my permissiveness towards my proclivity for digressions. I am twenty-one years old - this is a fact which my conscience will not allow me to escape during my flights into abstraction and theory. There is a temporal core to truth, say Horkheimer and Adorno, and I agree with them totally (the time for that truth has not passed). This applies not only to epochs, but to individuals as well. Everything I write and everything I think is colored by my context. Nietzsche reminds us that every work of philosophy rests upon the psychology of its writer (usually a lonely, eccentric bachelor), and that all ethical systems aim for the legitimation of the ethicist's prejudices. To recall my earlier remark, then: when we cite individuals to quote "their" ideas - despite our skepticism towards outmoded Romantic notions of genius (that is, the ability to think in a way radically different from one's cultural and chronological compatriots) - all we are doing is uniting an idea presumably created by the discourse of many people with each other (even if that discourse coalesces inside an individual's head) with the prejudices and weaknesses of an individual author (but those are also not just his own - there is a temporal core to pathology as well).
The preceding was an appallingly byzantine sentence. I apologize to anyone who tries to parse it. I experience the desire to add footnotes to this entry, which suggests that academic stylistics are taking over my informal style, which I had thought impervious to the depredations of the Modern Language Association and the like. But I'm not going to pontificate on the stiltedness of academic prose or anything of the sort. One should consider one's critiques in context. It is all-too-easy to join in with a mob venting its bile at a target far less guilty than it presently seems. As a general ethical attitude, I should, with a few necessary exceptions, avoid condemning what is already commonly condemned. - This not to be contrary, but to discourage myself from joining into those terrible feedback loops in which one feels both righteous and comfortable in attacking someone/thing from within a mob. This is why, living in the United States, I tend to argue for Russia's perspective in discussions of geopolitics. There is, of course, not a little emotional attachment to the mythical lost garden of my childhood mixed into that as well, but I think that my rationalization, however divergent from my personal realities, is a useful ethical consideration.
If philosophers can shape profound ideas out of their longings and privations, then why can't I attempt something of the same - albeit more consciously. That an idea is borne in deception, or even that it is false as regards its explicit object, is not enough to invalidate it for other applications.
I will return now to the issue of my age, if only out of formal considerations. Why is it that I continue to think, despite knowing better, that loving someone confers a debt upon that person? The answer, I think, is that this applies validly to considerations of other "positive" relationships. In committing an act of kindness (permit me to rehabilitate the word commit), one is within one's rights to expect gratitude. If I want to become friends with someone, it is perfectly reasonable to expect that person to want to become friends with me. After all, I would not choose a totally incompatible person for friendship, and most people are only happy to make another friend. Romantic feelings are obviously different. Not only are they exclusive, but they are also not unequivocally positive, although they stubbornly continue to seem that way.
Thoughts on this issue continue to follow an economic logic: if I invest energy in having "positive" feelings for λ, then shouldn't I expect something in return - the other end of the transaction? But "positive" feelings are incommensurable. Although I can expect a person to be nicer to me because I have advanced the offer of friendship, I cannot do the same following an offer of romantic attachment. In fact, I can expect to be rather rudely spurned, or ignored, or, perhaps, laughed at.
Most people are perfectly willing to be friends with their inferiors (my fellow students do not seem to fear any effect on their reputation by taking on unflattering friends - perhaps because of the meaninglessness of most friendships). A lover, however, has to be good enough. If it is the comparative insignificance of gratitude or friendliness compared to the commitment involved in even the typically abortive romantic relationship, then I have found the answer to my question, and I must admit that any fool could have told me that. Indeed, this is a perfectly adequate answer, if not a satisfying one. Loving does not entitle one to recompense, either from the object of love or from the universe as a whole. Put frankly, no one gives a fuck. Unrequited love is an absurd screaming into a vacuum.
And so we seek the consolation of philosophy.
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