Methodology

In Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Fredric Jameson writes of the inevitable incompleteness of any theory of the postmodern. Postmodernism, whether characterized, as with Lyotard, by the end of "master narratives," or, with Jameson, by the disappearance of the historicity of the modern age, is still described by those experiencing and observing it in narrative or historical terms (pp. xi-xii). But this seems unavoidable. For how else to conceptualize postmodernity (I struggle against the desire to write 'postmodern age'), except as a distinct period, differentiated from those that came before it by whatever peculiarities may be most relevant, but above all, perhaps, by its currentness. It seems that our ordinary conception of time inevitably connects the postmodern to the past as the latest in a series of discrete steps. However diffuse it is, by calling it postmodernism - by imagining it at all - we give it coherence, for we cannot imagine what has no form and no discernable characteristics.

The theoretical approaches characteristic of postmodernity call into question such concepts as narrative and truth. The questioning of truth, in turn, inevitably pulls logic from its pedestal. Given that the persuasiveness of an argument is based largely upon the audience's evaluation of the truth of its premises and the cogency of its logical progression, as well as the centrality of argument in theory, the questions raised by postmodern theory deprive it of its own justification. What is the value of theory in a world of multiplicities, or of argument in the absence of truth?

This contradiction does not, however, lead to a facile dismissal of postmodern theory. I am struck and disturbed by the facility with which my fellow university students dismiss wholesale such modes thought as philosophy or postmodernism. Such contempt reveals complete disbelief in the legitimacy of academic study in these areas and raises a variety of questions both about those responsible for such statements and regarding the place of non-empirical thought in this society. But that is matter for another discussion. In terms of the issue at hand, the contradiction at the heart of postmodern theory establishes at the very beginning that the belief in logic is both untenable and necessary. Logic seems to hold an innate attraction for people, and it is difficult, if not impossible to conceive or persuasive communication without it. If there is a way to articulate the postmodern condition without logic, and without immediately imposing the necessity of silence, then such a way has not yet been found. What remains, then, is that postmodern theory can only be communicated through logical argumentation, but the jarring incongruousness of form and content remind all involved that logic and argument themselves are under scrutiny. The related problem of objectivity - that such an idea can no longer seriously be entertained, although a theory that attempts to describe the experience of multiple people or the characteristics of a society inevitably assumes a perspective above the subjectivity of those it describes - is also only an issue of form. Nothing expressed by postmodern theory can be said to hold for all conditions, or even, perhaps, for all the individuals, or for all the states of a given individual, within the society that it describes. The method is sub-optimal, of course, but this is not indicative of a problem with the questions being asked. It is, rather, a problem with the established methods for answering them.

These are, admittedly, very loosely structured thoughts, and it is already evident to me that they contain major problems. Let this stand as a promise that I will return to the question of methodology in postmodern theory soon.